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Since the organization of individual agents in a network has an important role in the deter-
mination of the outcome of social and economic interaction there has been a huge amount of
literature on networks. The game-theoretical point of view on networks has received a lot of
attention in the last decade. Myerson (1977) provides a ﬁrst major contribution on cooperative
games and networks by introducing an allocation rule for cooperative games supplemented with
a network structure. Subsequently, Aumann and Myerson (1988) apply this allocation rule to
study the formation of networks by means of a game in extensive form. However, it lasted until
the work of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), in which they study the tension between eﬃciency
and stability, that the analysis of the formation of networks became a focal point. This has
up to now already resulted in a vast amount of literature. A survey of the literature that used
formal game theoretic reasoning to study the formation of networks can be found in Dutta and
Jackson (2003).
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) departed from the basic framework studied by Myerson (1977)
and Aumann and Myerson (1988) by starting with a value function that is deﬁned on networks
directly rather than a characteristic function that is deﬁned on coalitions. Though many
subsequent papers deal with value functions, cooperative games proved to be relevant from
diﬀerent points of view (see e.g., Jackson and van den Nouweland (2004) and Jackson (2004)).
In the current paper we will stick to the original setting of Aumann and Myerson (1988). For
their model of network/link formation in extensive form they note that for superadditive games
partial cooperation might result according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept.
For a similar model of link formation in strategic form, however, it was shown by Dutta et al.
(1998) that according to several equilibrium reﬁnements only networks with the same payoﬀs
as the full cooperation structure will result.
The issue whether in a speciﬁc setting equilibria lead to structures with the same payoﬀ
as the complete structure was studied by Slikker and Norde (2004). They consider the model
in extensive form of Aumann and Myerson (1988) for symmetric convex games and showed
that with at most ﬁve players the full cooperation structure can be formed in equilibrium.
Additionally, they showed for strictly convex symmetric games with at most 5 players that all
structures that can be formed in equilibrium result in the same payoﬀs as the full cooperation
structure. Furthermore, they showed that this last result cannot be extended to cooperative
games with 6 players. They consider a symmetric convex game with 6 players and show that
networks can result in which two players receive strictly less than they would according to the
full cooperation structure and four players receive strictly more. In fact, any pair of players can
be exploited, independent of the rule of order. With respect to this game Slikker and Norde
(2004) conclude with the following question:
“Does a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that results in a structure payoﬀ
equivalent to the full cooperation structure exist?”
In the current paper we will answer this question to the aﬃrmative for all initial orders of the
pairs of players.3
The setup of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide some preliminaries on games
and networks. The model of Aumann and Myerson (1988) and some notation and results of
Slikker and Norde (2004) can be found in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 contains the main result
of this paper.
2 Preliminaries
This section contains game and graph-theoretical notations and deﬁnitions that are used
throughout.
A cooperative game is a pair (N,v) where N = {1,...,n} is a ﬁnite set (of players) and
v : 2N → I R with v(∅) = 0 the characteristic function which assigns to any coalition S ⊆ N a
value v(S) which represents the worth of coalition S. A cooperative game (N,v) is superadditive
if for all T1 ⊆ N and all T2 ⊆ N\T1 it holds that
v(T1) + v(T2) ≤ v(T1 ∪ T2). (1)
A cooperative game (N,v) is convex if for all i ∈ N and all T1 ⊆ T2 ⊆ N with i ∈ T1 it holds
that
v(T1) − v(T1\{i}) ≤ v(T2) − v(T2\{i}). (2)
So, a game is convex if the marginal contribution of a player to any coalition is less than his
marginal contribution to a larger coalition. A cooperative game is strictly convex if (2) holds
with strict inequality for all i ∈ N and all T1 ⊂ T2 ⊆ N with i ∈ T1.
Let N be a set of players and let R ∈ 2N\{∅}. The unanimity game (N,uR) is the
game with uR(S) = 1 if R ⊆ S and uR(S) = 0 otherwise (see Shapley (1953)). Every
game (N,v) can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in a unique way, i.e.,
v =
P







for all i ∈ N.
A (communication) graph is a pair (N,L) where the set of vertices N represents the set of
players and the set of edges L represents the set of bilateral (communication) links. Two players
i and j are directly connected iﬀ {i,j} ∈ L. For notational convenience we usually denote ij
rather than {i,j} Two players i and j are connected (directly or indirectly) iﬀ i = j or there
exists a path between players i and j. The notion of connectedness induces a partition of the
player set into communication components, where two players are in the same communication
component if and only if they are connected. The set of communication components will be
denoted by N/L. The component C ∈ N/L containing player i ∈ N will be denoted by Ci(L).
Furthermore, denote the subgraph on the vertices in coalition S ⊆ N by (S,L(S)), where
L(S) = {ij ∈ L | {i,j} ⊆ S}, and the partition of S into communication components according
to graph (S,L(S)) by S/L. Furthermore, deﬁne LN = {ij | {i,j} ⊆ N}. Finally, the set of all
undirected graphs with vertex set N will be denoted by UGN.
1|R| denotes the cardinality of a set R.4
Myerson (1977) studied communication situations (N,v,L) where (N,v) is a cooperative
game and (N,L) a communication graph. An allocation rule for communication situations is
a function γ that assigns a payoﬀ vector γ(N,v,L) to any communication situation (N,v,L).




v(C) for all S ⊆ N.
So, a coalition is split into communication components and the value of this coalition in the
graph-restricted game is then deﬁned as the sum of the values of the communication components
in the original game. The allocation rule introduced by Myerson (1977) is the Shapley value of
the game (N,vL) and is usually referred to as the Myerson value of communication situation
(N,v,L). Notation:
µ(N,v,L) = Φ(N,vL).
The analysis in this paper concentrates on symmetric games. A game (N,v) is symmetric
if there exist v1,v2,...,v|N| ∈ I R such that v(S) = v|S| for all S ∈ 2N\{∅}. So, in a symmetric
game the value of a coalition only depends on its size.
3 A model of link formation
In this section we shortly recall the model of link formation studied by Slikker and Norde
(2004) and their main results. The model under consideration is (a variant of) the model of
link formation introduced by Aumann and Myerson (1988).
Let (N,v) be a cooperative game with |N| ≥ 2 and let γ be an allocation rule for com-
munication situations. Let σ be an exogenously given order of pairs of players. Formally,






is a bijection where σ(ij) = k denotes that pair ij is in position
k. We will denote the link formation game in extensive form determined by cooperative game
(N,v), allocation rule γ, and initial order σ by ∆lf(N,v,γ,σ). The game starts with no links
formed. The ﬁrst pair of players according to σ gets the opportunity to form a link. This link
is actually formed if and only if both players agree on forming this link. If a link is formed, it
cannot be broken in a further stage of the game. After a pair of players decided on whether or
not to form a link, the next pair of players according to σ who did not form a link with each
other yet, gets the opportunity to do so. After the last pair of players in the order has had
the opportunity to form a link, the ﬁrst pair of players in the order who did not form a link
with each other yet, gets a new opportunity to form the link between them. The process stops
when, after the last link that has been formed, all pairs of players who have not formed a link
with each other yet, have had a ﬁnal opportunity to do so and declined this oﬀer, i.e., in all
these pairs at least one of the players refuses to form the link. Throughout the process of link
formation the entire history of acceptances and rejections is known to all players. This process
results in a set of links, which represents in conjunction with the player set an undirected
graph. We will denote this set of links by L. The payoﬀs to the players are then determined
by the allocation rule, i.e., if (N,L) is formed player i ∈ N receives
γi(N,v,L).5
In the original model of Aumann and Myerson (1988) player i receives his Myerson value
µi(N,v,L). We will restrict ourselves to the Myerson value in this paper as well.
Aumann and Myerson (1988) already argued that since the game of link formation is of
perfect information it has subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Furthermore, they note that the
order in which two players in a pair decide whether or not to form a link has no inﬂuence (on
the outcome of the game). Either order leads to the same outcome as simultaneous choice.
Following Slikker and Norde (2004) we, with a slight abuse of notation, sometimes refer to
a decision of a link where we actually mean the decisions of the players in the (potential) link.
Consider such a decision of a link and assume that strategies are ﬁxed after the decision of
this link. If both players (weakly) prefer to form the link then we call their choice to form
subgame perfect. Furthermore, if at least one player (weakly) prefers not to form the link
then we call their choice not to form subgame perfect. We remark that if links play subgame
perfect then one can easily determine subgame perfect play of the players that results in the
same outcome. With respect to the notation of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in subgames
we follow Slikker and Norde (2004) as well. Let γ be an allocation rule for communication
situations and let (N,v) be a cooperative game. A link formation game in extensive form in
which the links in A have already been formed is denoted by ∆lf(N,v,γ,σ,A), with A ⊂ LN








an order of the pairs of players who did
not form a link with each other yet. If L is the set of links that have been formed in the
game then player i ∈ N receives γi(N,v,L ∪ A). We denote the set of subgame perfect Nash
equilibria of ∆lf(N,v,γ,σ) by SPNE(∆lf(N,v,γ,σ)) and, similarly, the set of subgame perfect
Nash equilibria of ∆lf(N,v,γ,σ,A) by SPNE(∆lf(N,v,γ,σ,A)). By σA,ij we denote the order
restricted to LN\A that results when the links in A have been formed and ij ∈ A is the
link in A that has been formed last. Then ∆lf(N,v,γ,σA,ij,A) is a subgame of ∆lf(N,v,γ,σ).




−|A|−1} we have that ∆lf(N,v,γ,σA,ij,A,k) is a subgame
of ∆lf(N,v,γ,σ) where after the last link in A has been formed, k pairs of players have had
the opportunity to form a link and have refused to do so.
If there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that results in graph (N,L) then this
graph is called a perfect equilibrium graph. We denote the set of perfect equilibrium graphs in
∆lf(N,v,γ,σ) by PEG(N,v,γ,σ). Similarly, we denote the set of graphs that result according
to subgame perfect equilibria in a subgame ∆lf(N,v,γ,σ,A) by PEG(N,v,γ,σ,A)
In case there is no ambiguity about the underlying game (N,v) or the allocation rule γ
we will sometimes simply omit it. So, for example, a link formation game can be denoted by
∆lf(N,v,γ,σ), ∆lf(γ,σ), or even ∆lf(σ). A similar remark holds for all other notations that
include an underlying cooperative game and/or an allocation rule.
The main results of Slikker and Norde (2004) deal with symmetric convex games. They show
that if the Myerson value is applied as an allocation rule then with at most ﬁve players the full
cooperation structure results according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if the
game is strictly convex then every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in a structure that
is payoﬀ equivalent to the full cooperation structure. Subsequently, they study a symmetric
game with six players that is strictly convex and show that there exists a subgame perfect Nash6
equilibrium that results in an incomplete structure in which two players are worse oﬀ than in
the full cooperation structure, whereas four players are better oﬀ. Independent of the initial
order any pair of players can end up being exploited. This game (N,v) with six players is
extensively studied in this paper and ﬁxed by player set N = {1,2,3,4,5,6} and characteristic
function v described by
v(T) =

        
        
0 if |T| ≤ 1;
60 if |T| = 2;
180 if |T| = 3;
360 if |T| = 4;
600 if |T| = 5;
1800 if T = N.
(3)
This characteristic function can alternatively be described by v = 60
P
i,j∈N:i6=j u{i,j}+900uN.
Recall that two graphs (N1,L1) and (N2,L2) are isomorphic if there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the vertices in N1 and those in N2 with the property that two vertices in N1
are connected directly in (N1,L1) if and only if the corresponding vertices in N2 are connected
directly in (N2,L2). An overview of the payoﬀs to the players in communication situations
(N,v,L), with (N,v) as described above and (N,L) any of the 156 non-isomorphic graphs
with six vertices, is taken from Slikker and Norde (2004) and can be found in appendix B. We
will refer to the graph with number i in appendix B by (N,Li).
The following notation is in line with Slikker and Norde (2004) as well. Note that in any
graph isomorphic to (N,L146) two players are exploited by the others, i.e., these two players
receive 298 only, whereas both of them would receive 300 in the full cooperation structure.
Furthermore, note that any exploited player is connected with exactly two not-exploited players
besides the other exploited player. The graph isomorphic to (N,L146) with players i and j
exploited and player i additionally connected to players r and t is denoted by G
i,j
r,t. Furthermore,
we denote Gi,j = {G
i,j
r,t | r,t ∈ N\{i,j}}, the set of graphs isomorphic to (N,L146) with players
i and j exploited. Note that Gi,j = Gj,i. We denote that a link l precedes l0 according to σ by
l ≺σ l0. If l and l0 are such that σ(l) = σ(l0) − 1 we say that l is right in front of l0 (according
to σ).
An intermediate result of Slikker and Norde (2004), lemma 5.1, is used extensively. We
recall this lemma below.
Lemma 3.1 (lemma 5.1 of Slikker and Norde (2004))
Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3), let L be the set of graphs that are payoﬀ
equivalent to (N,LN) or isomorphic to (N,L146), let L ⊂ LN, and let σ be any order of the
links in LN\L. Then PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L) ⊆ L.
As in Slikker and Norde (2004) we apply a speciﬁc format for describing a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. This is formalized in the following remark. More explanation can be found
in example 5.3 of Slikker and Norde (2004).7
Remark 3.1 We often use a speciﬁc format to describe a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in some subgame ∆lf(σ,A). This description will be in two parts. The ﬁrst part contains a
description of the choices of the links in the subgames that follow after the ﬁrst formation of a
link in the game under consideration, i.e, the subgames ∆lf(σA∪{l},l,A∪{l}) for any l ∈ LN\A.
The second part contains a description of the choices of the links that have not been described
in the ﬁrst part, i.e, the description of the initial choice of any link l in the subgame that
starts after all links that precede l according to σ have not formed. Formally, the second part
contains the initial choice of any link l ∈ LN\A in the subgame ∆lf(σ,A,σ(l) − 1). In general
the description of a part will distinguish between several cases, depending for example on the
position of l in σ. These cases will be presented as subparts. By backward induction it follows
that to prove that such a strategy proﬁle constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium it
suﬃces to show that the choices in part 1 constitute subgame perfect Nash equilibria in their
respective subgames and that the initial choices in part 2 are subgame perfect.
4 Stable structures
The main result of this section states that independent of the initial order there exists a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium that attributes the same payoﬀ to all players as they would receive
according to the full cooperation structure. The associated graphs are wheels, i.e., structures
in which each player is involved in two links and there is a unique path from a player to himself,
which involves all players.
First, we introduce some additional deﬁnitions. A wheel (N,W) is a graph that is isomorphic
to (N,{{1,2},{2,3},...,{n − 1,n},{n,1}}). So, a wheel is a graph with a set of links that
together form a cycle that traverses all points in the graph.
In graph (N,L) the link ab ∈ L is called physically exploitable if there exists G ∈ Ga,b with
L ⊆ G. So, ab is physically exploitable in (N,L) if ab ∈ L and adding links to (N,L) can result
in a graph that exploits a and b (they both receive 298). Stated yet diﬀerently, in (N,L) link
ab ∈ L is physically exploitable if there exists a strategy proﬁle in ∆lf(L) that ends in a graph
that exploits both a and b. We stress that according to the deﬁnition of physically exploitable
this strategy proﬁle is not required to be an equilibrium.
The following lemma shows that in any network any pair of players that are physically
exploitable can be exploited according to an SPNE. The proof of this lemma can be found in
appendix A.
Lemma 4.1 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). For all L ⊆ LN, all links
ab ∈ L that are physically exploitable in (N,L), and all orders σ of LN\L it holds that
PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L) ∩ Ga,b 6= ∅.
The following theorem deals with the stability of wheels.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3), let (N,L) be a wheel, and
let σ be any order of the links in LN\L. Then (N,L) ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L).8
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that L = {12,23,34,45,56,61}. A subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium s is described as follows.
1.a. l ∈ {13,15,24,26,35,46}: denote the elements of l by i and j, then there exists k ∈
N\{i,j} such that ik ∈ L and jk 6∈ L; ﬁx an SPNE that results in G∗ ∈ Gi,k (possible
by lemma 4.1).
1.b. l ∈ {14,25,36}: denote the elements of l by i and j; ﬁx an SPNE that results in G∗ ∈ Gi,j
(possible by lemma 4.1).
2. l ∈ LN\L: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b.: By construction.
2. If l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming it, then at least one of the
players in l will receive 298, whereas he will receive 300 according to (N,L), which is
formed according to s. This player prefers not to form l.
Consequently, s is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium implying that
(N,L) ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L).
This completes the proof. 2
Using lemma 4.1 we can also show that any pair of players who have not been formed yet,
who according to the current network receive less than when they are exploited, who are last
in the order under consideration, and are physically exploitable once their link has been added
to the current network, can be exploited according to an SPNE.
Lemma 4.2 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). For all L ⊆ LN, all ij 6∈ L
such that µi(L) ≤ 298, µj(L) ≤ 298, and such that there exists G ∈ Gi,j with L ∪ {ij} ⊆ G,
and all orders σ of LN\L with ij last it holds that PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L) ∩ Gi,j 6= ∅.
Proof: Let L ⊆ LN, ij 6∈ L such that µi(L) ≤ 298, µj(L) ≤ 298 and such that there exists
G ∈ Gi,j with L ∪ {ij} ⊆ G, and σ be an order of LN\L with ij last.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in some network G∗ ∈ Gi,j is described
as follows.
1.a. l = ij: an SPNE that results in some G∗ ∈ Gi,j (possible by lemma 4.1).
1.b. l ≺σ ij: any SPNE.
2.a. l = ij: form l.
2.b. l ≺σ ij: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b.: By construction.
2.a.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ij rather than forming it. Then (N,L)
results and both receive at most 298, whereas they both receive 298 according to G∗ ∈ Gi,j
which results if they choose forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ
of any of the players in l.9
2.b.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then, by lemma 3.1
a network isomorphic to (N,L146) or a network payoﬀ equivalent to LN results and both
receive at most 301. Since l 6= ij at least one of the players in l receives 301 if they choose
not forming l. Hence, at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ
by deviating.
This completes the proof. 2
The following lemma deals with exploiting the link that is right in front of the last link.
Lemma 4.3 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). Let L ⊆ LN, ij,ab 6∈ L such
that µa(L) ≤ 298, µb(L) ≤ 298, µi(L ∪ {ab}) ≤ 298, µj(L ∪ {ab}) ≤ 298, and such that there
exists G ∈ Gi,j with L ∪ {ab,ij} ⊆ G. Let σ be an order of LN\L with ab last and ij right in
front of ab. Then PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L) ∩ Gi,j 6= ∅.
Proof: A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in some network G∗ ∈ Gi,j is
described as follows.
1.a. l = ab: an SPNE that results in some G∗ ∈ Gi,j (possible by lemma 4.2).
1.b. l = ij: an SPNE that results in some G0 ∈ Gi,j (possible by lemma 4.1).
1.c. l ≺σ ab: any SPNE.
2.a. l = ab: form l.
2.b. l = ij: do not form l.
2.c. l ≺σ ij: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b.,1.c.: By construction.
2.a.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ab rather than forming it. Then (N,L)
results and both receive at most 298, whereas they both receive at least 298 according to
G∗ ∈ Gi,j which results if they choose forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve
the payoﬀ of any of the players in l.
2.b.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l = ij rather than not forming it. Then G0 ∈ Gi,j
results and both receive 298, whereas they both receive 298 as well according to G∗ ∈ Gi,j
which results if they choose not forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve the
payoﬀ of both of the players in l.
2.c.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then a network
isomorphic to (N,L146) or a network payoﬀ equivalent to LN results and both receive at
most 301. Since l 6= ij at least one of the players in l receives 301 if they choose not
forming l. Hence, at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ by
deviating.
This completes the proof. 210
The following lemmas deal with speciﬁc networks that are subnetworks of a wheel. Con-
secutively, we deal with networks with ﬁve, four, three and two links and provide suﬃcient
conditions for a wheel to result according to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when starting
with such a network. The type of network that is studied in the ﬁrst of these lemmas can be






















a: Network with 5 links b: Network with 4 links
Figure 1: Two networks
Lemma 4.4 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). Let W be a wheel and let
ij ∈ W. Let L = W\{ij}, and let σ be an order of LN\L. Then W ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L) and
there exists G∗ ∈ Gi,j such that G∗ ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L).
Proof: By lemma 4.1 we conclude that once ij is formed there exists an SPNE that results in
some G∗ ∈ Gi,j. Fix such a G∗. Let G ∈ {W,G∗}.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in network G is described as follows.
1.a. l σ ij: any SPNE.
1.b. l = ij: an SPNE that results in G (possible by deﬁnition of G∗ above and theorem 4.1).
1.c. l ≺σ ij: an SPNE that results in H ∈ Ga,b with ab ∩ l 6= ∅, which is possible by lemma
4.1. To see this, assume without loss of generality that W = {12,23,34,45,56,16} and
ij = 16 (see ﬁgure 1 (a)). For any l ∈ LN\W one can exploit a link l0 according to table
1.
l 13 14 15 24 25 26 35 36 46
l0 34 14 15 12 25 26 56 36 34
Table 1: Exploitable links
2.a. l σ ij: do not form.
2.b. l = ij: form l.
2.c. l ≺σ ij: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b.,1.c.: By construction.
2.a.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then, by lemma 3.1, a
graph isomorphic to (N,L146) or payoﬀ equivalent to (N,LN) results and both players in
l receive at most 301. Since at least one of them receives 314 or 349 according to (N,L)
(network (N,L) is isomorphic to (N,L33)), which results if they choose not forming l, at
least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ by deviating.11
2.b.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ij rather than forming it. Then L results
and both receive 237, whereas they both receive at least 298 according to G which results
if they choose forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the
players in l.
2.c.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then H ∈ Ga,b with
ab ∩ l 6= ∅ results and at least one of the players in l receives 298. Since both of them
receive at least 298 if they choose not forming l at least one of the players in l does not
strictly improve his payoﬀ by deviating.
This completes the proof. 2
The type of network that is studied in the next lemma can be found in ﬁgure 1 (b).
Lemma 4.5 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). Let W be a wheel and let
ij,ab ∈ W with ij and ab disjunct, and ia ∈ W. Let L = W\{ij,ab}, and let σ be an order
of LN\L with ab ≺σ ij. Then W ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L) and there exists G∗ ∈ Gi,j such that
G∗ ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L).
Proof: By lemma 4.4 we know that once ab is formed there exists an SPNE that results in
some G∗ ∈ Gi,j. Fix such a G∗. Let G ∈ {W,G∗}.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in network G is described as follows.
1.a. l σ ij: any SPNE.
1.b. l = ij: an SPNE that results in H ∈ Ga,b (possible by lemma 4.4).
1.c. ab ≺σ l ≺σ ij: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy∩l 6= ∅, which is possible by
lemma 4.1. To see this assume without loss of generality that W = {12,23,34,45,56,16},
ij = 16, and ab = 23. For any l ∈ LN\W one can exploit a link l0 according to table 2.
l 13 14 15 24 25 26 35 36 46
l0 13 14 15 24 25 26 56 36 34
Table 2: Exploitable links
1.d. l = ab: an SPNE that results in G (possible by deﬁnition of G∗ above and lemma 4.4).
1.e. l ≺σ ab: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy ∩ l 6= ∅ (possible by lemma 4.1;
see also the description of s, part 1.c).
2.a. l σ ij any subgame perfect choice.
2.b. l = ij: form l.
2.c. ab ≺σ l ≺σ ij: do not form l.
2.d. l = ab: form l.
2.e. l ≺σ ab do not form.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.a.: By construction.12
2.b. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ij rather than forming it. Then, using
lemma 3.1, it follows that (N,L), a network isomorphic to (N,L146), or a network payoﬀ
equivalent to (N,LN) results. In all cases both players receive at most 301, whereas both
receive 301 if they choose forming l. Hence, the deviation does not strictly improve the
payoﬀ of any of the players in l.
2.c.,2.e: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then H ∈ Gx,y
with xy ∩ l 6= ∅ results and at least one of the players in l receives 298. Since both of
them receive at least 298 if they choose not forming l at least one of the players in l does
not strictly improve his payoﬀ by deviating.
2.d.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ab rather than forming it. Then H ∈ Ga,b
results and both players receive 298, whereas they both receive at least 300 if they choose
forming l. Hence, the deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the players
in l.
This completes the proof. 2
Lemma 4.6 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). Let W be a wheel and let
ij,ab,cd ∈ W be three pairwise disjunct links. Let L = W\{ij,ab,cd}, and let σ be an order
of LN\L. Then W ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L).
Proof: Without loss of generality assume that cd ≺σ ab ≺σ ij.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in network G is described as follows.
1.a. l σ ab: any SPNE.
1.b. l = ab: an SPNE that results in H ∈ Gc,d (possible by lemma 4.5).
1.c. cd ≺σ l ≺σ ab: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy = l (possible by lemma
4.1).
1.d. l = cd: an SPNE that results in W (possible by lemma 4.5).
1.e. l ≺σ cd: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy = l (possible by lemma 4.1).
2.a. l σ ab any subgame perfect choice.
2.b. l = ab: form l.
2.c. cd ≺σ l ≺σ ab: do not form l.
2.d. l = cd: form l.
2.e. l ≺σ cd do not form.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e. 2.a.: By construction.
2.b. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ab rather than forming it. Then, using
lemma 3.1, we conclude that (N,L), a network isomorphic to (N,L146), or a network
payoﬀ equivalent to (N,LN) results. In all cases both players receive at most 301, whereas
both receive 301 if they choose forming l. Hence, the deviation does not strictly improve
the payoﬀ of any of the players in l.13
2.c.,2.e: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then H ∈ Gx,y
with xy = l results and both players in l receive 298. Since both of them receive at least
298 if they choose not forming l at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve
his payoﬀ by deviating.
2.d.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = cd rather than forming it. Then H ∈ Gc,d
results and both players receive 298, whereas they both receive 300 if they choose forming
l. Hence, the deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the players in l.
This completes the proof. 2
Lemma 4.7 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). Let ij, ab, and cd be three
pairwise disjunct links. Let L = {ij,ab} and let σ be an order of LN\L with σ(cd) ≥ 11. Then
there exists a wheel W such that W ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L).
Proof: We will distinguish between three cases based on the position of cd in the order: (i)
σ(cd) = 13; (ii) σ(cd) = 12; (iii) σ(cd) = 11.
Case (i): A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in a wheel is described as
follows.
1.a. l = cd: an SPNE that results in a wheel W (possible by lemma 4.6).
1.b. l ≺σ cd: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy = l (possible by lemma 4.1).
2.a. l = cd: form l.
2.b. l ≺σ cd: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b.: By construction.
2.a. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = cd rather than forming it. Then (N,L)
results and both players in l receive 0, whereas they both receive 300 according to W
which results if they choose forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ
of any of the players in l.
2.b. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then H ∈ Gx,y with
xy = l results and both players in l receive 298. Since both of them receive 300 if they
choose not forming l at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ
by deviating.
Case (ii): A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in a wheel is described as
follows.
1.a. l = σ−1(13): an SPNE that results in some G ∈ Gc,d (possible by lemma 4.2).
1.b. l = cd: an SPNE that results in a wheel W (possible by lemma 4.6).
1.c. l ≺σ cd: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy = l (possible by lemma 4.1).
2.a. l = σ−1(13): form l
2.b. l = cd: form l.14
2.c. l ≺σ cd: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b., 1.c. By construction.
2.a. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l rather than forming it. Then (N,L) results.
Both players then receive at most 30 ((N,L) is isomorphic to (N,L4)), whereas both
receive at least 298 if they choose forming l. Hence, the deviation does not strictly
improve the payoﬀ of any of the players in l.
2.b. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = cd rather than forming it. Then G ∈ Gc,d
results and both receive 298, whereas they both receive 300 according to W which results
if they choose forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the
players in l.
2.c. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then H ∈ Gx,y with
xy = l results and both players in l receive 298. Since both of them receive 300 if they
choose not forming l at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ
by deviating.
Case (iii) A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in a wheel is described as
follows.
1.a. l = σ−1(13): we distinguish between two cases.
Case I {σ−1(12),σ−1(13)} = {kc,kd} for some k ∈ N\{c,d}: an SPNE that results in
H ∈ Gx,y with σ−1(12) = xy and L ∪ {σ−1(12),σ−1(13)) ⊆ H. (possible by lemma 4.2;
note that σ−1(12) is physically exploitable in (N,L ∪ {σ−1(12),σ−1(13)}) )
Case II Otherwise: an SPNE that results in some G∗ ∈ Gc,d (possible by lemma 4.3;
note that cd is physically exploitable in (N,L ∪ {cd,σ−1(12),σ−1(13)})).
1.b. l = σ−1(12): an SPNE that results in some G ∈ Gc,d (possible by lemma 4.2).
1.c. l = cd: an SPNE that results in a wheel W (possible by lemma 4.6).
1.d. l ≺σ cd: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy = l (possible by lemma 4.1).
2.a. l = σ−1(13): form l.
2.b. l = σ−1(12): form l.
2.c. l = cd: form l.
2.d. l ≺σ cd: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b., 1.c.,1.d: By construction.
2.a. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l rather than forming it. Then (N,L) results
and both players in L receive at most 30 ((N,L) is isomorphic to (N,L4)), whereas
they both receive at least 298 if they choose forming ij. The deviation does not strictly
improve the payoﬀ of any of the players in l.
2.b. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l rather than forming it. Then G ∈ Gc,d
results or H ∈ Gx,y with σ−1(12) = xy. A network G ∈ Gc,d results if they choose
forming l. Since both x and y receive at least as much according to G ∈ Gc,d as according
to H ∈ Gx,y, a deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the players in l.15
2.c. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = cd rather than forming it. Then G ∈ Gc,d
results and both receive 298, whereas they both receive 300 according to W which results
if they choose forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the
players in l.
2.d. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then H ∈ Gx,y with
xy = l results and both players in l receive 298. Since both of them receive 300 if they
choose not forming l at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ
by deviating.
This completes the proof. 2
Before we continue we introduce a concept that describes the distance between two links
according to an order of the links in LN. For any order σ of LN and any l1,l2 ∈ LN we deﬁne
the distance between l1 and l2 as dσ(l1,l2) = |σ(l1) − σ(l2)|.
The following lemma shows that for any order there exist two disjunct links with a distance
between them of at most 3.
Lemma 4.8 Let σ be an order of LN. Then there exist l1,l2 ∈ LN with l1 ∩ l2 = ∅ and
dσ(l1,l2) ≤ 3.
Proof: Let li be the link that is in position i according to σ, for i = 1,...,15. If there exists
a pair of disjunct links in the set {l1,l2,l3,l4} we are done. So, from now on assume that there
is no pair of disjunct links in the set {l1,l2,l3,l4}.
Denote l1 = xy. Since l2 ∩ l1 6= ∅ denote without loss of generality l2 = xz. Since l3 is
not disjunct from xy or xz we have that x ∈ l3 or l3 = yz. In the latter case l4 will always
be disjunct from at least one of the ﬁrst three links. Hence, without loss of generality denote
l3 = xw. Subsequently, we directly conclude that l4 should contain x as well. Denote l4 = xu.
Then either link l5 is disjunct from at least one of the links l2, l3, l4 or link l5 contains x and
the unique player in N\{x,y,z,w,u}, say t. Then, however, it cannot be that l6 is disjunct
from xw, xu, and xt since the ﬁve links containing player x occupied the ﬁrst ﬁve places in the
order. We conclude that l6 is disjunct from at least one of the links l3,l4,l5
This completes the proof. 2
We use this lemma to prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). Let σ be an order of LN.
Then there exist a wheel W such that W ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,σ).
Proof: Let ab, cd be two disjunct links with dσ(ab,cd) ≤ 3 (possible by lemma 4.8). Without
loss of generality assume that 0 ≤ σ(ab) − σ(cd) ≤ 3. Let ij be the link that is disjunct from
both ab and cd. Let τ = σ{ij},ij. First we prove a claim.
Claim: There exists a wheel W∗ such that W∗ ∈ PEG(N,v,µ,τ,{ij}).16
Proof of claim: Let W be a wheel that can be formed according to an SPNE once ab has
been formed additionally (possible by lemma 4.7; note that σ{ij,ab},ab(cd) ≥ 11.). A subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in W is described as follows.
1.a. l τ ab: Let vw = σ−1(σ(l) − 1). If ij, l, vw do not form a triangle then an SPNE that
results in G ∈ Gv,w.2 Otherwise, let tu = σ−1(σ(l)−2) and choose an SPNE that results
in H ∈ Gt,u (possible by lemmas 4.2 and 4.3; note that tu is physically exploitable in
(N,{ij,l,vw,tu}) ).
1.b. l = ab: an SPNE that results in wheel W (possible by deﬁnition of W).
1.c. l ≺τ ab: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy = l (possible by lemma 4.1).
2.a. l τ ab: form l.
2.b. l = ab: form l.
2.c. l ≺τ ab: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b., 1.c.: By construction.
2.a. Forming l is obviously subgame perfect if l is last according to σ. From now on assume
that l is not last according to σ. Let l = xy. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l
rather than forming it. Then G ∈ Gx,y ∪Gv,w results, whereas H ∈ Gv,w ∪Gt,u results if
they choose forming l. Obviously, none of the players in xy strictly improves his payoﬀ by
deviating if G ∈ Gx,y. Furthermore, none of the players in xy strictly improves his payoﬀ
by deviating if both G ∈ Gv,w and H ∈ Gv,w. This covers all cases because H ∈ Gt,u
implies that there is no G0 ∈ Gv,w such that {ij,vw,xy} ⊆ G0. This in turn implies that
ij,vw,xy form a triangle. Hence, ij and xy cannot form a triangle with the link that
follows xy according to σ. Consequently, if H ∈ Gt,u then G ∈ Gx,y.
2.b. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ab rather than forming it. Then G ∈ Ga,b
results and both receive 298, whereas they both receive 300 according to W which results
if they choose forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the
players in l.
2.c. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then H ∈ Gx,y with
xy = l results and both players in l receive 298. Since both of them receive 300 if they
choose not forming l at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ
by deviating.
This completes the proof of the claim. We use this claim in the proof of the theorem.
1.a. l σ ij: An SPNE that results in G ∈ Gx,y with {l,xy} ⊆ G, where xy = σ−1(σ(l) − 1)
(possible by lemma 4.2).
1.b. l = ij: an SPNE that results in a wheel W (possible by claim above).
1.c. l ≺σ ij: an SPNE that results in some H ∈ Gx,y with xy = l (possible by lemma 4.1).
2.a. l σ ij: form l.
2.b. l = ij: form l.
2.c. l ≺σ ij: do not form l.
2Note that if σ(l) = 2 then link ab is in ﬁrst position and no triangle is formed by ij, l and ab = vw.17
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b., 1.c.: By construction.
2.a. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l rather than forming it. Then (N,L) results
or H ∈ Gx,y, where l = xy, and both players in l receive at most 298, whereas they both
receive at least 298 according to G which results if they choose forming l. The deviation
does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the players in l.
2.b. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ij rather than forming it. Then G ∈ Gi,j
results and both receive 298, whereas they both receive 300 according to W which results
if they choose forming l. The deviation does not strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the
players in l.
2.c. Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then H ∈ Gx,y with
xy = l results and both players in l receive 298. Since both of them receive 300 if they
choose not forming l at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ
by deviating.
This completes the proof. 2
This paper has been devoted completely to the analysis of a 6-person symmetric convex
game, the game described by (3). More speciﬁcally, we analyzed the associated link formation
games in extensive form. The main conclusion from this paper, cf. theorem 4.2, states that
starting with no links formed, any order of the links can result in the same payoﬀ for all players,
coinciding with their payoﬀs according to the full cooperation structure. This adds to the result
of Slikker and Norde (2004) who showed that for these situations any pair of players can end up
being exploited and, moreover, solves their open question. Whether for any symmetric strictly
convex game we can always end up in a structure that results in the same payoﬀs as the full
cooperation structure remains an open question.
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A Proof of lemma 4.1
Before we prove the lemma we need two additional lemmas.
Lemma A.1 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). Let L ⊆ LN, ab ∈ L, and
ij 6∈ L such that
- ab ∩ ij = ∅;
- µi(L) ≤ 301 and µj(L) ≤ 301;
- PEG(N,v,µ,τ,L ∪ {ij}) ∩ Ga,b 6= ∅ for any order τ of LN\(L ∪ {ij}).
Furthermore, let σ be an order of LN\L. Then PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L) ∩ Ga,b 6= ∅.
Proof: A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in some graph in Ga,b is described
as follows.
1.a. l σ ij: any SPNE.
1.b. l = ij: an SPNE that results in some G ∈ Ga,b (possible by assumption).
1.c. l ≺σ ij: any SPNE.
2.a. l σ ij: any subgame perfect choice.
2.b. l = ij: form l.
2.c. l ≺σ ij: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b.,1.c.,2.a: By construction.
2.b.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ij rather than forming it. Then, using
lemma 3.1, (N,L), a network isomorphic to (N,L146) or a network payoﬀ equivalent to
LN results and both players in l receive at most 301, whereas they both receive 301
according to G ∈ Ga,b which results if they choose forming l. The deviation does not
strictly improve the payoﬀ of any of the players in l.19
2.c.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then, by lemma 3.1,
a network isomorphic to (N,L146) or a network payoﬀ equivalent to LN results and both
receive at most 301. Since ab ∈ L we have that l 6= ab. Consequently, at least one of the
players in l receives 301 if they choose not forming l. Hence, at least one of the players
in l does not strictly improve his payoﬀ by deviating.
This completes the proof. 2
Lemma A.2 Let (N,v) be the 6-person game described by (3). Let L ⊆ LN, ab ∈ L, and
ij 6∈ L such that
- i ∈ ab and j 6∈ ab;
- µi(L) ≤ 298 and µj(L) ≤ 301;
- PEG(N,v,µ,τ,L ∪ {ij}) ∩ Ga,b 6= ∅ for any order τ of LN\(L ∪ {ij}).
- for all cd ∈ LN\(L ∪ {ij}) if holds that either µc(L) ≥ 301 or µd(L) ≥ 301 or there exists
z ∈ N\{i} with iz ∈ L∪{cd} and PEG(N,v,µ,τ,L∪{cd})∩Gi,z 6= ∅ for any order τ of
LN\(L ∪ {cd}).
Furthermore, let σ be an order of LN\L. Then PEG(N,v,µ,σ,L) ∩ Ga,b 6= ∅.
Proof: A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium s that results in some graph in Ga,b is described
as follows.
1.a. l σ ij: if there exists z ∈ N\{i} with iz ∈ L ∪ {l} and PEG(N,v,µ,σL∪{l},l,L ∪ {l}) ∩
Gi,z 6= ∅ then an SPNE that results in some G∗ ∈ Gi,z; else any SPNE.
1.b. l = ij: an SPNE that results in some G ∈ Ga,b (possible by assumption).
1.c. l ≺σ ij: any SPNE.
2.a. l σ ij: a subgame perfect choice where l chooses not forming l if at least one player is
indiﬀerent between forming l and not forming l.
2.b. l = ij: form l.
2.c. l ≺σ ij: do not form l.
We will show that s is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1.a., 1.b.,1.c.,2.a: By construction.
2.b.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., not forming l = ij rather than forming. Then (N,L)
results or a network that results after the formation of some l0(σ l). If (N,L) results
neither i nor j improves its payoﬀ.
It remains to consider the case that some network results after the formation of some
l0(σ l). A network that is formed after the formation of some l0 σ l is called a network
of type A if this network belongs to some Gi,z with z ∈ N\{i} and iz ∈ L ∪ {l0}. It is
called a network of type B otherwise. Note that if after the formation of l0 a network
of type B results then, by lemma 3.1, this network is isomorphic to (N,L146) or payoﬀ
equivalent to LN.20
Suppose a network of type B will result. Let l00 be the last link according to σ that chooses
forming l00 and results in a network of type B. If l00 would have chosen not forming l00
then (N,L) results or a network of type A. In the latter case the players in l00 cannot end
up with 298 both since l00 6∈ L ∪ {l∗}, where l∗ denotes the ﬁrst link that forms after l00
chose not to form. By assumption we know that according to (N,L) at least one of the
players in l00 receives at least 301. So, in both cases at least one of the players receives
at least 301 after deviating and at most 301 after forming l00. This is in conﬂict with the
description of s, part 2.a. Hence, if l deviates then the resulting network will not be a
network of type B. We conclude that a network of type A results after l deviates. In such
a network player i receives 298 and player j receives 301 (since l = ij 6∈ L ∪ {l∗∗}, where
l∗∗ denotes the ﬁrst link that forms after ij has deviated). If ij chooses forming l then i
receives 298 and j receives 301 as well. So, neither of the players in l can strictly improve
his payoﬀ by deviating.
2.c.: Suppose l deviates from s, i.e., forming l rather than not forming. Then, by lemma 3.1,
a network isomorphic to (N,L146) or a network payoﬀ equivalent to LN results and both
receive at most 301. Since l 6= ab at least one of the players in l receives 301 if they
choose not forming l. Hence, at least one of the players in l does not strictly improve his
payoﬀ by deviating.
This completes the proof. 2
Using these lemmas we can prove lemma 4.1.
Proof: Tables 3 to 5 in appendix B provide, up to isomorphisms, for all L ⊆ LN with |L| ≤ 10
and its links ab ∈ L that are physically exploitable a link ij ∈ LN\L such that either
- ab ∩ ij = ∅;
- µi(L) ≤ 301 and µj(L) ≤ 301;
- ab is physically exploitable in (N,L ∪ {ij});
all hold or
- i ∈ ab and j 6∈ ab;
- µi(L) ≤ 298 and µj(L) ≤ 301;
- ab is physically exploitable in (N,L ∪ {ij});
- for all cd ∈ LN\(L ∪ {ij}) it holds that either µc(L) ≥ 301 or µd(L) ≥ 301 or there exists
z ∈ N\{i} with iz ∈ L ∪ {cd} and iz physically exploitable in (N,L ∪ {cd}).
all hold.
The proof will be by induction to the number of links. For any L with |L| ≥ 11 the
statement in the lemma is obviously true. Suppose the statement in the lemma is true for all
L with |L| = k + 1 for some k ∈ {1,...,10}. Let L be such that |L| = k and let ab ∈ L.
By the induction hypothesis and the arguments above, we conclude that there exists a link
ij such that either
- ab ∩ ij = ∅;21
- µi(L) ≤ 301 and µj(L) ≤ 301;
- PEG(N,v,µ,τ,L ∪ {ij}) ∩ Ga,b 6= ∅ for any order τ of LN\(L ∪ {ij});
all hold or
- i ∈ ab and j 6∈ ab;
- µi(L) ≤ 298 and µj(L) ≤ 301;
- PEG(N,v,µ,τ,L ∪ {ij}) ∩ Ga,b 6= ∅ for any order τ of LN\(L ∪ {ij}).
- for all cd ∈ LN\(L ∪ {ij}) it holds that either µc(L) ≥ 301 or µd(L) ≥ 301 or there exists
z ∈ N\{i} with iz ∈ L∪{cd} and PEG(N,v,µ,τ,L∪{cd})∩Gi,z 6= ∅ for any order τ of
LN\(L ∪ {cd}).
all hold.
Lemmas A.1 and A.2 above suﬃce to prove that the statement in the lemma is true for
(N,L) and ab.
This completes the proof. 2
B Non-isomorphic graphs with 6 players
This appendix deals with payoﬀs in communication situations with (N,v) of equation (3) as the under-
lying game. Tables 3 through 5 provide an overview of these payoﬀs for all 156 non-isomorphic graphs
with 6 players according to the Myerson value. This part of the tables is taken from Slikker and Norde
(2004). Furthermore it provides for any physically exploitable link an associated link that is used in the
proof of lemma 4.1.
Speciﬁcally, in the last column one can ﬁnd three types of elements in the vectors in the last column.
A ’0’ represents that the corresponding link has not been formed yet. For example, in L1, the ﬁrst
element is ’0’ because 12 has not been formed in L1. An ’x’ represents that the corresponding link has
been formed but it is not physically exploitable. For example, in L6 the ﬁrst element is ’x’ because 12
forms a triangle with 13 and 23, so 12 has been formed but cannot be physically exploited. Finally,
an ’ij’ means that the corresponding link is physically exploitable and ij is the link that is used in
the proof of lemma 4.1. Here, we have two cases depending on whether or not ij is disjunct from the
corresponding link. As an example for the ﬁrst case, the ﬁrst element for L2 is 34, which is disjunct
from the corresponding link 12. Note that players 3 and 4 both receive less than 301 in L2 and that 12 is
physically exploitable in L3, the network that results if 34 is added to L2. As an example of the second
case, element 14 in the vector associated with L33 is 56, which is not disjunct from the corresponding
link 46. Note that players 5 and 6 receive less than 301 and 298, respectively. If 56 is added, L54 results
(a wheel). Obviously, link 46 is physically exploitable in L54. Furthermore, let cd ∈ LN\(L∪{ij}), i.e.,
cd ∈ {14,15,16,23,25,26,34,36,45}. Since players 1, 2, 3, and 4 all receive more than 301 in L33 we
conclude that µc(L) ≥ 301 or µd(L) ≥ 301.
Except for L146, the network in which link 56 is exploited, there are no physically exploitable links
in networks with at least 11 links. Therefore, we leave the last column for networks with 11 links or
more empty.22
number graph µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5 µ6 associated link
1 (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
2 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (30, 30, 0, 0, 0, 0) (34;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
3 (1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (80, 50, 50, 0, 0, 0) (34;24;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
4 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (30, 30, 30, 30, 0, 0) (35;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;0;0;0)
5 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (150, 70, 70, 70, 0, 0) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
6 (1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (60, 60, 60, 0, 0, 0) (x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
7 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (115, 115, 65, 65, 0, 0) (34;25;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
8 (1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (80, 50, 50, 30, 30, 0) (34;24;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;16;0;0)
9 (1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30) (35;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;0;0;13)
10 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (240, 90, 90, 90, 90, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
11 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (130, 80, 80, 70, 0, 0) (x;x;25;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
12 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (200, 150, 85, 85, 80, 0) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;16;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
13 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (150, 70, 70, 70, 30, 30) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;23)
14 (1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (60, 60, 60, 30, 30, 0) (x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;16;0;0)
15 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (90, 90, 90, 90, 0, 0) (35;25;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;15;0;0;0;0;0)
16 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (162, 142, 142, 77, 77, 0) (34;25;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;0;14;0;0;0;0)
17 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (115, 115, 65, 65, 30, 30) (34;25;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;14)
18 (1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) (80, 50, 50, 80, 50, 50) (34;24;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;16;15;0)
19 (1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (500, 260, 260, 260, 260, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
20 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (220, 100, 100, 90, 90, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
21 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (455, 335, 255, 255, 255, 245) (x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;34;0;0;0;0;0;0)
22 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (95, 95, 85, 85, 0, 0) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
23 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (165, 165, 100, 85, 85, 0) (x;x;26;0;0;x;0;16;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
24 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (180, 95, 95, 150, 80, 0) (x;x;25;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;16;0;0)
25 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (130, 80, 80, 70, 30, 30) (x;x;25;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;24)
26 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (400, 400, 250, 250, 250, 250) (34;45;35;0;0;0;0;34;34;0;0;0;0;0;0)
27 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (178, 113, 113, 88, 108, 0) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;16;0;0;16;0;0;0;0)
28 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (412, 327, 327, 250, 242, 242) (45;45;56;0;0;0;0;46;0;0;0;45;0;0;0)
29 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (389, 359, 247, 247, 319, 239) (34;46;36;0;0;0;0;34;0;0;0;0;0;0;34)
30 (1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) (60, 60, 60, 80, 50, 50) (x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;16;15;0)
31 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (90, 90, 90, 90, 30, 30) (35;25;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;15;0;0;0;0;14)
32 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (120, 120, 120, 120, 120, 0) (34;25;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;0;14;0;16;0;0)
33 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (349, 349, 314, 314, 237, 237) (56;56;0;0;0;0;56;0;0;0;56;0;0;56;0)
34 (1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (480, 270, 270, 260, 260, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
35 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (185, 115, 105, 105, 90, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
36 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (420, 350, 270, 255, 255, 250) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;34;0;0;0;0;0;0)
37 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (200, 100, 100, 100, 100, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;x;0;0)
38 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0) (435, 265, 265, 335, 255, 245) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;25;0)
39 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0) (436, 286, 286, 258, 258, 276) (x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;34;0;0;24;0;0;0)
40 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (90, 90, 90, 90, 0, 0) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0)
41 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (118, 118, 173, 103, 88, 0) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;0;16;0;0;0;0)
42 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (95, 95, 85, 85, 30, 30) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;34)
43 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (350, 350, 350, 250, 250, 250) (x;x;56;0;0;x;0;46;0;0;0;45;0;0;0)
44 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (131, 131, 106, 116, 116, 0) (x;x;26;0;0;x;0;16;0;0;0;0;16;0;0)
45 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0) (377, 342, 265, 327, 247, 242) (x;x;35;0;0;x;0;36;0;0;0;0;0;35;0)
46 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) (380, 260, 260, 400, 250, 250) (x;x;25;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;26;25;0)
47 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1) (369, 257, 257, 359, 319, 239) (x;x;26;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;26;0;26)
48 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0) (366, 366, 281, 253, 281, 253) (34;45;36;0;0;0;0;34;34;0;46;0;0;0;0)
49 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (132, 112, 112, 112, 132, 0) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;16;0;0;16;0;16;0;0)
50 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (392, 280, 280, 332, 272, 244) (36;26;23;0;0;0;0;36;0;0;26;0;0;23;0)
51 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1) (360, 288, 288, 252, 360, 252) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;34;0;0;24;0;0;0;23)
52 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1) (374, 297, 297, 254, 289, 289) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;34;0;0;0;24;0;0;23)
Table 3: Payoﬀs for game of equation (3) and associated links, used in the proof of lemma 4.1, part 1
.23
number graph µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5 µ6 associated link
53 (1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1) (60, 60, 60, 60, 60, 60) (x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;x;x;x)
54 (1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300) (34;25;0;0;0;0;15;0;0;0;14;0;0;15;14)
55 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (445, 285, 275, 275, 260, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
56 (1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) (460, 270, 270, 270, 270, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;x;0;0)
57 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (135, 135, 110, 110, 110, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
58 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (370, 370, 275, 275, 255, 255) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0)
59 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (180, 110, 110, 110, 90, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0)
60 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (138, 123, 123, 108, 108, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;0;0)
61 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (373, 288, 358, 273, 255, 253) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;25;0;0;0)
62 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (400, 280, 270, 270, 335, 245) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;34)
63 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0) (431, 291, 291, 258, 258, 271) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;x;0;0;x;0;0;0)
64 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0) (400, 350, 270, 265, 265, 250) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;34;0;0;0;x;0;0)
65 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0) (389, 304, 276, 289, 258, 284) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;34;0;0;0;0;35;0)
66 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1) (416, 268, 268, 286, 286, 276) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;25;24)
67 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0) (391, 283, 283, 283, 259, 301) (x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;34;0;0;24;0;23;0)
68 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (90, 90, 90, 90, 30, 30) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;15)
69 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (117, 117, 127, 127, 112, 0) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;0;16;0;16;0;0)
70 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (293, 293, 355, 355, 252, 252) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;0;16;0;0;15;0)
71 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1) (285, 285, 387, 267, 332, 244) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;0;16;0;0;0;16)
72 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0) (308, 308, 360, 285, 285, 254) (x;x;56;0;0;x;0;46;0;0;0;46;46;0;0)
73 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0) (309, 301, 273, 371, 291, 255) (x;x;26;0;0;x;0;36;0;0;0;0;26;35;0)
74 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1) (317, 317, 274, 299, 299, 294) (x;x;35;0;0;x;0;34;0;0;0;0;0;35;34)
75 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1) (380, 260, 260, 380, 260, 260) (x;x;25;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;x;x;x)
76 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0) (368, 308, 308, 256, 280, 280) (45;45;56;0;0;0;0;46;45;0;46;45;0;0;0)
77 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0) (324, 324, 288, 288, 288, 288) (34;45;36;0;0;0;0;34;34;0;34;0;0;34;0)
78 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (321, 286, 286, 293, 321, 293) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;34;0;0;24;0;0;23;23)
79 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) (395, 305, 280, 280, 280, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0)
80 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (440, 280, 280, 280, 260, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;0)
81 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0) (398, 293, 293, 278, 278, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;0;0)
82 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1) (425, 285, 275, 275, 270, 270) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;x)
83 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (130, 130, 115, 115, 110, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;0)
84 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (311, 311, 366, 278, 278, 256) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;0;0;45;0;0;0)
85 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0) (365, 365, 280, 280, 255, 255) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;0)
86 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0) (311, 381, 296, 278, 276, 258) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;0;0;0)
87 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1) (327, 327, 281, 281, 292, 292) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;0;34)
88 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (395, 275, 275, 275, 335, 245) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;26)
89 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (124, 119, 119, 119, 119, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;x;0;0)
90 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (316, 298, 293, 363, 275, 255) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;25;0)
91 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) (375, 287, 300, 300, 258, 280) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;25;0;25;0)
92 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1) (332, 296, 314, 278, 291, 289) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;25;0;0;25)
93 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,0,0) (411, 291, 291, 268, 268, 271) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;x;0;0;x;x;0;0)
94 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,0) (386, 288, 288, 283, 259, 296) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;x;0;0;x;0;25;0)
95 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0) (332, 309, 278, 309, 278, 294) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;35;0;0;0;x;35;0)
96 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1) (332, 304, 280, 286, 286, 312) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;34;0;0;0;0;35;34)
97 (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,1) (328, 286, 286, 286, 286, 328) (x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;x;0;0;x;0;x;x)
98 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1) (285, 285, 303, 303, 368, 256) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;0;16;0;16;0;16)
99 (1,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (291, 291, 316, 316, 293, 293) (x;x;x;0;0;x;x;0;0;0;16;0;0;15;15)
100 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,0) (298, 305, 305, 318, 287, 287) (x;x;56;0;0;x;0;16;0;0;0;15;16;15;0)
101 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1) (312, 312, 276, 312, 312, 276) (x;x;36;0;0;x;0;36;0;0;0;0;x;x;x)
102 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0) (308, 308, 308, 284, 308, 284) (46;46;46;0;0;0;0;46;46;0;46;46;46;0;0)
103 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (330, 330, 285, 285, 285, 285) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0;0)
104 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0) (390, 300, 285, 285, 280, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;0)
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number graph µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5 µ6 associated link
105 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0) (336, 316, 301, 283, 283, 281) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;0)
106 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (420, 280, 280, 280, 270, 270) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;x;0;0;0;0;x)
107 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0) (384, 289, 289, 289, 289, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;x;0;0)
108 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0) (341, 303, 298, 298, 280, 280) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;x;0)
109 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0) (122, 122, 122, 117, 117, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0)
110 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0) (303, 303, 373, 285, 278, 258) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;0;0)
111 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (306, 306, 283, 283, 366, 256) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;36)
112 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) (311, 311, 306, 306, 282, 284) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;0;0;56;0;56;0)
113 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1) (322, 322, 286, 286, 292, 292) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;35)
114 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,0,0) (319, 319, 319, 281, 281, 281) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;x;x;0;0;0)
115 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,0) (295, 378, 290, 290, 288, 259) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;x;0;0)
116 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0) (322, 322, 299, 299, 279, 279) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;0;x;0)
117 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1) (311, 324, 293, 282, 304, 286) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;0;0;34)
118 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (306, 295, 295, 308, 308, 288) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;36;26)
119 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1) (316, 292, 298, 298, 287, 309) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0;25;0;25;34)
120 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,1,0) (327, 291, 291, 304, 280, 307) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;x;0;0;x;x;25;0)
121 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,1) (323, 291, 291, 286, 286, 323) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;x;0;0;x;0;x;x)
122 (1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,1,1) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300) (x;x;26;0;0;x;0;16;0;0;0;15;x;x;x)
123 (1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,0) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300) (34;24;23;0;0;0;0;16;15;0;16;15;16;15;0)
124 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0) (325, 325, 290, 290, 285, 285) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;0;0)
125 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,0) (382, 292, 292, 287, 287, 260) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;0;0)
126 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0) (328, 308, 308, 290, 283, 283) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;0;0)
127 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1) (331, 311, 288, 288, 301, 281) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;0;0;x)
128 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0) (320, 313, 295, 295, 284, 293) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;x;0)
129 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1) (315, 297, 297, 297, 297, 297) (x;x;x;x;x;x;x;0;0;0;x;0;0;x;x)
130 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0) (120, 120, 120, 120, 120, 0) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;0)
131 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0) (293, 293, 293, 376, 286, 259) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;0;x;0)
132 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0) (309, 309, 309, 309, 282, 282) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;x;0)
133 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1) (301, 301, 314, 290, 307, 287) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;0;46)
134 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,1) (303, 303, 298, 298, 298, 300) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;x;0;0;0;45;0;35;34)
135 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,0,0) (301, 314, 314, 294, 294, 283) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;x;x;x;0;0)
136 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1) (298, 315, 293, 293, 315, 286) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;x;0;x)
137 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,1) (306, 306, 295, 295, 299, 299) (x;x;x;x;0;x;x;0;x;0;x;0;0;x;34)
138 (1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,1,1) (318, 291, 291, 291, 291, 318) (x;x;x;x;0;x;0;0;x;0;0;x;x;x;x)
139 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0) (317, 317, 297, 292, 292, 285)
140 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1) (320, 320, 290, 290, 290, 290)
141 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,0) (380, 290, 290, 290, 290, 260)
142 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,0) (318, 298, 298, 311, 291, 284)
143 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1) (310, 303, 303, 292, 296, 296)
144 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,1) (307, 304, 295, 295, 295, 304)
145 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1) (296, 296, 296, 313, 313, 286)
146 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,1) (301, 301, 301, 301, 298, 298)
147 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,0) (301, 301, 305, 305, 294, 294)
148 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0) (306, 306, 306, 294, 294, 294)
149 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,0) (315, 315, 295, 295, 295, 285)
150 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0) (307, 307, 300, 300, 293, 293)
151 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1) (305, 298, 298, 302, 302, 295)
152 (1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,1) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300)
153 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0) (304, 304, 304, 297, 297, 294)
154 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,1) (302, 302, 299, 299, 299, 299)
155 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0) (301, 301, 301, 301, 298, 298)
156 (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) (300, 300, 300, 300, 300, 300)
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